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the Interior, 
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CHARLES ELMWOOD CONRAD and 
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to review the decision of the State 
Engineer filed pursuant to §73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, as a trial 
de novo in accordance with the provisions of §73-3-15, U.C.A., 
1953, with adjunct declaratory judgments that four out of the 
five conditions imposed by the decision of the State Engineer 
were without authority and contrary to law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was dismissed with prejudice on intervenors'-
respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to §73-3-15, U.C.A., 
1953, for failure of plaintiffs to prosecute the action to 
final judgment within two years after it was filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to affirm the order of dismissal 
with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with appellants' basic statement of 
facts with the following exceptions and additions: 
Plaintiffs' original complaint filed on October 4, 1974, 
(R.231-246 incl.), joined the State Engineer as the only 
defendant in spite of the fact that in the administrative 
proceedings before the State Engineer all of the intervenors 
except Scott P. Wallace and Ruth Wallace filed protests against 
the granting of Change Application No. a-5433 (App. Brief, 
p. 3, R.237). Thus Appellants' Brief is in error on page 5 
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therof wherein it states that Darrel A. Conrad, Vilate P. 
(Mrs. Warren) Conrad, Charles E. Conrad and Alice P. Conrad 
made no previous protest to the State Engineer. 
Intervenors' motion to dismiss filed January 24, 1975, 
(R.136, 137) referred to on page 5 of Appellants' Brief was 
based on plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable parties. 
Intervenors' motion was granted in part (R.128) and the lower 
court entered its order that plaintiffs amend their complaint 
and join the United States of America and Utah Power & Light 
Company or suffer dismissal (R.102). 
Plaintiffs' Second, Third and Fourth Causes o~ Action 
are separate causes to review the decision of the State 
Engineer pursuant to §73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, as a trial de novo 
in accordance with the provisions of §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, by 
incorporating separately therein, the allegations of plaintiffs' 
First Cause of Action (R.233-235 incl.; 105-107 incl.). As 
adjunct thereto, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments 
that four out of the five conditions imposed by the decision 
of the State Engineer were without authority and contrary to 
law. 
On December 29, 1977, intervenors jointly filed their 
motion to dismiss the action pursuant to §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, 
for failure of plaintiffs to prosecute the action to final 
judgment within two years after it was filed (R.39, 40). 
Intervenors filed their Statement of Points and Authorities 
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in support of their motion to dismiss (R.41-43 incl.). 
Plaintiffs filed their Answering Statement of Points (R.35-38) 
incl.) to which intervenors filed their Reply Points and 
Authorities (R.22-32 incl.). After a full hearing the lower 
court granted intervenors' motion to dismiss with prejudice 
(R.15) and on March 27, 1978, made and entered its order of 
dismissal with prejudice (R.16, 17). 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
§73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, mandates the dismissal of any 
suit to review a decision of the State Engineer which is 
not prosecuted to final judgment in the district court within 
two years after it is filed. More than three years and two 
months elapsed between the filing of this action and intervenors' 
motion to dismiss. Thus the sole issue on this appeal is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
action with prejudice. Reliance National Life Insurance Compant 
v. Caine, Utah, 555 P.2d 276 (1976); Westinghouse Electric 
Supply Company v. Paul w. Larsen Contractor, Inc., Utah, 544 
P.2d 876 (1975); Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 
259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. 
BroWn, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED §73-3-15, U.C.A., 
1953, IN DISMISSING THIS ACTION. 
- 3 -
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At the outset, respondents respectfully submit that 
the case of Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742, Utah (1975) is 
dispositive of this case and mandates the dismissal of the 
action with prejudice under the Doctrine of Stare Decisis. 
20 Am.Jur. 2d Courts, §83, pp. 519, 520. In Dansie v. 
Lambert, supra, the motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to 
§73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, only 26 months after the complaint 
was filed and the judgment of the trial court in dismissing 
the action with prejudice was affirmed. In so doing, this 
Court stated on page 744 thereof: 
"Some may not approve the legislation, 
subject of this case, but in substance and 
effect it is nothing more nor less than a 
limitations statute, which may be displeasing 
to one who is its victim, but which like other 
similar statutes is one of repose, designed to 
put a time barrier against litigation, in 
determining the precious water rights in this 
arid state. We are not they that may question 
the wisdom of the legislature on any constit-
utional or prejudiciality basis under the 
circumstances here." 
As to the mandatory nature of the statute, this Court then 
stated: 
"If plaintiff should contend that the statute 
is not mandatory, then in addition to other 
authorities unnecessary to cite here, this court, 
in a very recent case, Herr v. Salt Lake County, 
525 P.2d 728 (Utah), 1974, and cases therein 
mentioned, seem to be quite dispositive as to any 
interpretation of the words "shall" and "must" used 
in the statute here (73-3-15), as being anything 
but mandatory, and not discretionary." 
~ v. Lambert, supra, was cited with approval in Provo City 
v. Lambert, Utah, 545 P.2d 185 (1976). Likewise .. in Daniels 
- 4 -
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Irrigation Comoany v. Daniel Summit Co., Utah, (1977), 571 
P.2d 1323, this court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal 
from the State Engineer's decision as not being timely pros-
ecuted noting that §73-3-15, U.C.A. 1953 provides for a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment 
within two years. 
In the instant case, more than three years and two months 
elapsed between the filing of the action and intervenors' rnotior, 
to dismiss. Thus plaintiffs failed to prosecute this action 
to a final judgment in the court below within the two-year 
time limitation of §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, and we respectfully 
submit that the trial court properly applied the provisions 
thereof in dismissing the action with prejudice. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the 
Action With Prejudice. 
On page 6 of Appellants' Brief, selected provisions 
of §73-3-15, U.C.A., are there quoted and appellants then 
assert that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and 
improperly applied the same in dismissing this action. In 
so doing, appellants purposely ignore the key provision 
thereof to-wit 
"All suits heretofore or hereafter commenced 
must be dismissed •.. unless such suits are or were 
prosecuted to final judgment within the time 
specified above; . . . " (underscoring added) 
Appellants then assert that there is !!.2_ language in 
the foregoing statute that would lend credence to the 
supposition that failure to prosecute to final judgment 
- 5 -
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within the specified time necessarily warrants a dismissal 
with prejudice. We say that the foregoing provision not only 
lends credence to the supposition but mandates a dismissal 
as was squarely decided by this court in Dansie v. Lambert, 
supra. 
Appellants then assert that the trial court should 
have applied the criteria of Westinghouse Electric Supply 
Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 
(1975), Polk v. Ivers, Utah, 561 P.2d 1075 (1977), and Utah 
Oil Company v. Harris, Utah, 565 P.2d 1135 (1977). In short, 
none of those cases involved a dismissal under §73-3-15, 
u.C.A., 1953, and are clearly distinguishable from the 
instant case. Likewise, none of those cases involved a 
limitation statute designed to put a time barrier against 
litigation, in determining the precious water rights in this 
arid state and as such are inapplicable to the instant case. 
Appellants then apparently concede that the trial 
court has no discretion to modify the two or three year 
limitation period set forth in §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, but 
assert that even so the trial court was not stripped of 
its power to dismiss the action without prejudice by either 
the legislature or this court. In Dansie v. Lambert, supra, 
the majority of this court affirmed the dismissal with 
2rejudice. Aside from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Ellett therein, a dismissal without prejudice would fly square 
into the face of both §73-3-14 and §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953. 
- 6 -
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Thus, an action to review must be filed within 60 days after 
notice of the decision under §73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, and 
under the express terms of §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953 
"An action to review a decision of the 
State Engineer shall be dismissed . . . if the 
complaint was not filed ... within 60 days 
after notice of the decision." (underscoring 
added). 
Thus, a dismissal without prejudice would be to no avail since 
the 60-day period for the filing of the action under §73-3-14, 
U.C.A., 1953, has long since expired and any new action now 
filed must be dismissed under §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953. 
Nor is §78-12-40, U.C.A., 1953, of any help to 
appellants since it applies only where an action is dismissed 
otherwise than upon the merits. Rule 41 (b), U.R.C.P., provides 
that a dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with the rules operates as an adjudicatio: 
upon the merits unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies. 
§73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, provides for dismissal upon the 
grounds provided in Rule 41, U.R.C.P., and for purposes of 
that section failure to prosecute a suit to final judgment 
within two years after it is filed ... shall constitute lack 
of diligence. It is a statute of repose, designed to put 
a time barrier against litigation, in determining the precious 
water rights in this arid state. Dansie v. Lambert, supra. 
To say that an action which has not been prosecuted to final 
Judgment within the two-year time limitation can be dismissed 
- 7 -
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without prejudice and thereafter plaintiff has an additional 
one year within which to commence the action under §78-12-40, 
u.c.A., 1953, and thereafter two years within which to prosecute 
the new action to final judgment, etc., is not only a subter-
fuge to the mandatory dismissal provisions of the statute but 
is contrary to the whole purpose thereof as above stated by 
this Court. 
On page 10 of Appellants' Brief, complaint is made about 
the period of time taken by the State Engineer in issuing his 
Memorandum Decision. Suffice it to say there is no limitation 
statute within which the State Engineer must act and if 
appellants were so concerned they had their remedies by way 
of mandamus, etc. 
Appellants then assert that the motions to intervene 
seriously impeded the tempo of the entire proceeding and 
complicated their burden of proof. To begin with, appellants' 
failure to join intervenors as parties defendant was the 
sole cause for any delays resulting from the motions to 
intervene and are wholly chargeable to appellants. 
Practically all of the intervenors were protestants 
to appellants' change application and participated in the 
hearings before the State Engineer (R.109-112 incl.). When 
appellants filed this action to review the decision of the 
State Engineer they chose to ignore these intervenors and 
joined only the State Engineer as the sole defendant. The 
answer of the State Engineer raised plaintiffs' failure to 
- 8 -
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join indispensable parties as a defense. Appellants still did 
nothing about it and the motions to intervene were filed. After 
hearing, intervention was ordered. The trial court found that 
the United States of America and Utah Power & Light Company 
were indispensable parties and ordered that plaintiffs join 
said parties within 30 days from the date thereof and that 
their failure to do so would result in a dismissal of the 
action. 
Thereupon, appellants filed their amended complaint on 
March 19, 1975, with the only amendments being to join the 
United States of America and Utah Power & Light Company as 
parties defendants. Answers to the amended complaint were 
filed by April 15, 1975 (R.77). 
The sum and substance of it all is that the delays 
complained of in the court below resulted from the failure of 
plaintiffs to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the first instance and particularly Rule 19 thereof. Thus, 
any delays occasioned thereby are chargeable solely to 
appellants. Contrary to appellants' assertion on page 11 of 
their brief, the motions to intervene have not impeded the 
tempo or complicated appellants' burden at all. The defenses 
asserted in intervenors' answers are practically identical 
with those asserted by the State Engineer in his answer to 
the original complaint. 
But even so, the amended complaint was filed on March 19, 
1975, which is still two years and nine months (33 months) prio: 
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to the filing of intervenors motions to dismiss. Furthermore, 
answers to the amended complaint were filed by April 15, 1975, 
some two years and eight months prior to the filing of inter-
venors' motions to dismiss. As such appellants can hardly 
complain that they were delayed or prevented from prosecuting 
their action to final judgment within the two-year period 
because of intervenors' participation in this case. 
Next appellants pose questions of the res judicata 
effect of the dismissal with prejudice. The answer is simple, 
ie. the decision of the State Engineer dated August 9, 1974, 
in approving Change Application No. a-5433 with the conditions 
imposed remains intact. A decision of the State Engin~er 
on an application to change the place of diversion or place 
of use of the water does not adjudicate the law of the case 
on the issues involved nor is it binding precedent. East Bench 
Irrigation Co. v. State, 5 Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603 (1956). 
The decision of the courts on an appeal from the decision of 
the State Engineer has the same effect and no more on the 
rights of applicant to proceed with the proposed project 
as the same decision of the State Engineer would have been 
without an appeal. East Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, supra, 
p. 239. Such decision, the same as the decision of the State 
Engineer, is based only on a finding that there is reason to 
believe that rights may be acquired in accordance with the 
application and is not an adjudication of the relative rights 
of the parties. Likewise, such decisions are based on a 
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finding of reason to believe that certain facts do or may 
exist if the application is approved rather than a finding of 
such facts. East Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, supra, p. 241. 
In the instant case the net effect of the dismissal 
with prejudice is a decision that appellants' Change Applicatic 
No. a-5433 is approved upon the conditions imposed by the 
State Engineer. Thus appellants are authorized to proceed 
with the changes covered thereby but only upon the conditions 
imposed. That is all that the dismissal decides. To speculate 
on the effect of this dismissal on a new change application 
which might or might not be filed by appellants is premature 
and will remain so unless and until such a new change applic-
ation is filed. Only then and in that event will there be a 
justiciable issue ripe for decision. 
We respectfully submit that Appellants' Brief falls 
far short of demonstrating that the trial court committed 
error in dismissing this action with prejudice. What is more, 
the record in this case simply does not support appellants' 
contention. On the contrary the record is clear that the 
trial court correctly and properly dismissed the action with 
prejudice under the clear mandate of the statute and the 
stare decisis of Dansie v. Lambert, supra. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint in its Entirety. 
Appellants assert on page 13 of their brief that only 
the First Cause of Action was brought pursuant to §73-3-15, 
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u.c.A., 1953, and the other three were brought pursuant to 
the declaratory judgment act. To the contrary, all four 
causes of action were brought pursuant to §73-3-15, U.C.A., 
1953, and as an adjunct thereto the last three sought 
declaratory judgments that four of the five conditions 
imposed by the decision of the State Engineer were without 
authority or contrary to law. This is made abundantly clear 
by the very first paragraph of each of the Second, Third 
and Fourth Causes of Action which incorporate all of the 
allegations of the First Cause of Action. 
But even so, the dismissal of the appeal validates 
the approval of Change Application No. a-5433 by the State 
Engineer with all of the conditions imposed. As such, there 
is no justiciable controversy which can be adjudicated by way 
of a declaratory judgment. To say that the conditions are 
without authority and contrary to law becomes quite meaning-
less when those conditions have already been validated by 
the dismissal of the appeal. To seek an adjudication thereof 
when the issue is moot is to seek an advisory opinion which is 
not permissible. Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 
701 (1968). Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed 
the complaint in its entirety. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953. 
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Appellants' argument under its Point II is but a 
capsule form rehash of its prior argument. The record is 
clear that the only thing appellants did since the filing 
of the amended complaint was to file answers to interrogatories 
on July 8, 1975 (R.49-53 incl.), file a request for production 
of documents on August 19, 1975 (R.46-48 incl.) and file a 
notice of deposition on September 17, 1975 (R.44, 45). In 
fact, more than two years and two months elapsed between 
the last activity of appellants and the filing of intervenors' 
motion to dismiss, 
For appellants to speculate that under the statute in 
question adversary parties are totally free to prolong the 
litigation and in effect deprive the plaintiffs of their 
cause of action has absolutely no application here. There is 
nothing in the record to show that respondents delayed or 
prolonged the litigation. In fact any delays in placing 
the case at issue were solely attributable to appellants' 
failure to follow and comply with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The cold, hard facts are that more than three years 
and two months elapsed from the filing of the complaint, more 
than two years and nine months elapsed from the filing of the 
amended complaint and more than two years and two months 
elapsed since appellants did anything until intervenors' 
motion to dismiss was filed. Accordingly the trial court 
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correctly and properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to §73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. 
The time-honored rule of appellant review applicable 
here is that the ruling of the court below will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the record plainly shows that 
the court below abused its discretion. Thompson Ditch Company 
v. Jackson, supra. Stated otherwise, the ruling of the court 
below will not be disturbed unless it is manifest from the 
record that the court's discretion has been abused. Brasher 
Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, supra. 
It is one thing to assert an abuse of discretion and 
quite another thing for the record to bear it out. Likewise, 
it is one thing for appellants to base their contention on 
the assumption that the court misinterpreted the statute 
as appellants do on page 14 of their brief, and it is quite 
another thing for the record to plainly or manifestly so show. 
The record is devoid of any showing, let alone a plain 
showing or a manifest showing, that the trial court abused 
its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice. As 
such, appellants have wholly failed to meet their burden on 
this appeal. Accordingly the dismissal with prejudice must 
be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
§73-3-15, U.C.A., 1953, mandates the dismissal of this 
action for failure to prosecute to final judgment in the court 
below within two years after it was filed. More than three 
years and two months elapsed from the filing of the complaint, 
more than two years and nine months elapsed from the filing of 
the amended complaint and more than two years and two months 
elapsed since appellants did anything until intervenors' motion 
to dismiss was filed. The trial court correctly applied the 
statute to this case in accordance with Dansie v. Lambert, 
supra, and did not commit error in dismissing the action in 
its entirety with prejudice. 
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in dismissing this action with 
prejudice. Appellants have wholly failed to meet their burden 
of a plain and manifest showing in the record that the trial 
court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the order of 
dismissal with prejudice must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOVAK, ttorney for 
Intervenors Provo River 
Water Users Association, 
Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City, Utah 
Lake Distributing Company 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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